THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
JOAN E. BRUNER, Defendant-Appellee.
NO. 4-95-1016
APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS, FOURTH DISTRICT

285 Ill. App. 3d 39, 675 N.E.2d 654, 221 Ill. Dec. 459, 1996 Ill. App. LEXIS 
923
December 6, 1996, FILED

Appeal from Circuit Court of Macon County. No. 95CF1110. Honorable John K. 
Greanias, Judge Presiding. 

As Corrected January 3, 1997. Released for Publication December 6, 1996. 

COUNSEL
For THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellant: Lawrence R. 
Fichter, State's Attorney, Decatur, IL. Norbert J. Goetten, Director, State's 
Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor, Springfield, IL. Robert J. Biderman, Dep. 
Dir., State's Attorneys Aplt. Prosecutor, Springfield, IL. Scott A. Manuel, 
Staff Atty, State's Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor, Springfield, IL. 
For JOAN E. BRUNER, Defendant-Appellee: Jeff Justice, Campbell & Robinson, 
Decatur, IL. 
JUDGES
Honorable James A. Knecht, J., Honorable Robert W. Cook, J. - CONCUR, 
Honorable Frederick S. Green, J. - CONCUR. JUSTICE KNECHT delivered the 
opinion of the court. 
AUTHOR: KNECHT
OPINION
{*40} JUSTICE KNECHT delivered the opinion of the court: 
Defendant, Joan E. Bruner, was charged in the circuit court of Macon County 
with unlawful use of weapons and unauthorized possession of weapons in 
violation of sections 24-1(a)(4) and 21-6(a) of the Criminal Code of 1961 
(Code) (720 ILCS 5/24-1(a)(4), 21-6(a) (West 1994)). Defendant filed a motion 
to dismiss count I for unlawful use of weapons alleging it did not state an 
offense as charged because defendant was exempt from criminal responsibility 
under section 24-2(i) of the Code (720 ILCS 5/24-2(i) (West 1994)) due to the 
fact the gun in her possession was unloaded; it was in a case, and she 
possessed a valid firearm owners identification (FOID) card. The trial court 
dismissed count I and the State has appealed. We affirm. 
The facts are undisputed. Defendant came to the Macon County courthouse on a 
small claims matter. At the security checkpoint she handed her purse to the 
deputy and proceeded through the checkpoint. The deputy examined her purse 
and discovered an unloaded gun in a case and a valid FOID card. Defendant was 
then charged with the felony offense of unlawful use of weapons (see 720 ILCS 
5/24-1(a)(4) (West 1994)) and also a misdemeanor charge for bringing {*41} a 
gun into a publicly funded building without permission of the security 
officer (see 720 ILCS 5/21-6(a) (West 1994)). 
Section 24-1(a)(4) of the Code prohibits the carrying of a concealed weapon, 
without specifying whether it is loaded or unloaded, cased or encased. 
Section 21-6(a) of the Code prohibits possession of a weapon whether loaded 
or unloaded, encased or not, broken down or not, on State or federal land "or 
in any building on such land without prior written permission from the chief 
security officer for such land." 720 ILCS 5/21-6(a) (West 1994). 
Defendant filed a motion to dismiss directed to the felony charge. Count I 
charged defendant: 
"did commit the offense of UNLAWFUL USE OF WEAPONS, in that she knowingly 
concealed on her person, a pistol, at a time when she was not on her own 
land, or in her own abode, or a fixed place of business, said pistol being 
carried unloaded in a case and said defendant being in possession of a valid 
[FOID] Card, but not covered by the exemption in 720 ILCS, [sic] 5/24-2(i)." 

Section 24-2(i) of the Code provides: 
"Nothing in this Article shall prohibit, apply to, or affect the 
transportation, carrying, or possession, of any pistol or revolver, stun gun, 
taser, or other firearm consigned to a common carrier operating under license 
of the State of Illinois or the federal government, where such 
transportation, carrying, or possession is incident, to the lawful 
transportation in which such common carrier is engaged; and nothing in this 
Article shall prohibit, apply to, or affect the transportation, carrying, or 
possession of any pistol, revolver, stun gun, taser, or other firearm, not 
the subject of and regulated by subsection 24-1(a)(7) or subsection 24-2(c) 
of this Article, which is unloaded and enclosed in a case, firearm carrying 
box, shipping box, or other container, by the possessor of a valid [FOID] 
Card." 720 ILCS 5/24-2(i) (West 1994). 

Defendant argued section 24-2(i) of the Code contains an exemption to the 
offense of unlawful use of weapons which allows a person to carry an 
unloaded, encased weapon so long as she has a valid FOID card. The State 
argued this exemption applied only to common carriers, otherwise it is a 
"concealed carry" law. Defendant contended, however, the last part of section 
24-2(i) of the Code, after the semicolon, applied to her as charged. She 
argued this section is designed to allow a person, for example, to purchase a 
weapon at a store and transport it home, unloaded and in a case. 
The trial court found, while the provision of section 24-2(i) "may allow for 
mischief," it provided an exemption for defendant under these circumstances 
and dismissed count I. Count II remains pending. The State has appealed 
pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 604(a)(1). 145 Ill. 2d R. 604(a)(1). 
{*42} On appeal, the State has abandoned its contention section 24-2(i) of 
the Code applies only to common carriers but contends the exemption was not 
intended to allow persons to carry weapons, even unloaded and encased, as 
they go about their daily business but was intended to allow persons to 
transport weapons from one location to another such as to their homes after 
purchasing a weapon. The State notes a distinction between taking a gun to a 
destination and going to a destination with a gun. 
The fundamental rule of statutory construction is to determine the intent and 
meaning of the legislature. People v. Frieberg, 147 Ill. 2d 326, 345, 589 
N.E.2d 508, 517, 168 Ill. Dec. 108 (1992). The plain meaning of the language 
used is the best indicator of legislative intent. This rule does not prevail 
in the face of ambiguity or where the literal interpretation yields a result 
inconsistent with other provisions relating to the same subject. People v. 
Alejos, 97 Ill. 2d 502, 511, 455 N.E.2d 48, 52, 74 Ill. Dec. 18 (1983). A 
statute must be read as a whole and all relevant parts considered. People v. 
Lewis, 158 Ill. 2d 386, 389, 634 N.E.2d 717, 719, 199 Ill. Dec. 664 (1994). 
In regard to the specific statute at issue, the courts have found the 
legislature did not intend the statutory exemptions should be given a broad 
interpretation ( People v. Goss, 146 Ill. App. 3d 723, 725, 497 N.E.2d 357, 
359, 100 Ill. Dec. 379 (1986)) and, thus, must be strictly construed. People 
v. Lofton, 69 Ill. 2d 67, 71-72, 370 N.E.2d 517, 519, 12 Ill. Dec. 713 
(1977). 
Interpretation of the exemption in section 24-2(i) of the Code appears to be 
an issue of first impression. Defendant does not contend the exemption found 
in section 24-2(i) applies to section 21-6 of the Code (720 ILCS 5/ 21-6 West 
1994)). The exemption could not apply because section 21-6 is found in an 
entirely separate article of the Code from section 24-2(i). 
As noted, the State no longer contends the entire section deals with common 
carriers and we agree. The legislative history of the act adding this 
exemption to section 24-2 of the Code (720 ILCS 5/24-2 (West 1994)) 
provides some background. The sponsor of the bill, Representative Cullerton, 
stated during legislative debate: 
"What the Bill does first of all is to make it clear that common carriers, 
that would be like for example, truck drivers who are bringing and 
transporting weapons within the State are not violating the law. There's some 
question right now with respect to the Unlawful Use of Weapons Statute as to 
whether or not they are exempted. So we do that. *** And also the final thing 
would be to define how we wish to transport weapons when we are not on our 
own land or in our own house or on our own place of business. And we're only 
talking about weapons that are not loaded. *** All we're saying is that if 
you are transporting your gun, it must be {*43} in a case, a container or a 
box. If it's in a vehicle, it must be unloaded and in a container or a case. 
But what we do say is that if you're walking in a city, down the street with 
an unloaded gun in the open, right now, that's legal, and what we're saying 
with this Bill is that that should not be legal." 82d Ill. Gen. Assem., House 
Proceedings, May 16, 1981, at 3-4 (statements of Representative Cullerton). 

The second portion of section 24-2(i) after the semicolon is a separate 
exemption from that of the first portion dealing specifically with common 
carriers. 
The State contends "transport" means to take an object to a specific 
destination. The language of the exemption includes not only the act of 
transporting but also carrying or possession of a weapon, the common 
definitions of which would not be limited to taking the weapon to a specific 
destination. Other than the portion of the legislative debate cited above, 
the only other discussion during the legislative debate which deals with this 
point occurred between Representatives Koehler and Cullerton: 
"Koehler: 'Perhaps I heard you incorrectly, but I thought you said that 
you can..you have to have a..an unloaded gun in a case now when you carry it 
on the street. Is that correct?' 

Cullerton: 'That's correct. In a city.' 

Koehler: 'In a city.' 

Cullerton: 'Right, that's what the law would do. In another [sic] words, 
say you're going out to hunt. You put your gun in a..unloaded, you'd unload 
it, you'd put it in any kind of a container or case and put it in the car.' 

Koehler: 'Okay, and this...and..but what about carrying it on the street?' 

Cullerton: 'It has to be in a...' 

Koehler: 'It has to be in a case.' 

Cullerton: '..case. Right. Only if it's in the city. If you're out in 
the..outside of an corporated area, you can have it in the open. Okay? But if 
you're on the street, walking down the street with a gun unloaded, it would 
be against the law.'" 82d Ill. Gen. Assem., House Proceedings, May 16, 1981, 
at 5-6 (statements of Representatives Koehler and Cullerton). 

We include the portions of the legislative debate not because we believe they 
are determinative, but simply to demonstrate the legislature was considering 
the assorted applications of the exemption. The best indication of 
legislative intent is the language of the exemption as adopted. Even allowing 
for the strict construction of the exemption provided in section 24-2(i), the 
legislature intended the exemption to apply not only to transporting a gun, 
as in the situation {*44} of purchasing a gun and transporting it home or 
transporting a hunting rifle to the location of the hunt, but to also apply 
to the carrying and possession of a gun while simply walking down the street. 
We agree with the trial court the exemption "may allow for mischief." 
However, it clearly applies to defendant because her pistol was unloaded, in 
a case and she had a valid FOID card. The exemption did not require her to be 
transporting the pistol to a specific location in order to hunt or target 
shoot or take a recently purchased weapon to her residence. The State 
suggests this exemption, as interpreted by defendant, would actually provide 
a "concealed carry" law. We note "concealed carry" laws deal with the 
concealed possession of a weapon in a holster and do not provide the weapon 
must be unloaded. See Fla. Stat. Ann. § 790.06 (West Supp. 1996); Tex. Rev. 
Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 4413(29ee) (West Supp. 1997). The exemption here 
specifically provides the weapon must be unloaded and in a case. 
Our ruling is not an endorsement of the defendant's behavior. Citizens 
carrying unloaded weapons, even if encased, into courthouses is a prelude to 
violence. Unloaded weapons can readily be loaded. Arguably, a violation of 
section 21-6(a) of the Code should be a felony rather than a misdemeanor. The 
exemption provided by the legislature permits the defendant under these 
circumstances to avoid prosecution under section 24-2(i) of the Code for the 
felony charge, but she remains subject to the misdemeanor offense proscribed 
by section 21-6(a) of the Code. The remedy for the mischief noted by the 
trial court is a matter for the legislature. 
The judgment of the trial court dismissing count I due to the exemption 
provided in section 24-2(i) of the Code is affirmed. 
Affirmed. 
COOK and GREEN, JJ., concur. 
DISPOSITION

Affirmed.